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It is open to men to debate whether economic progress is good for men or not,
but for women to debate the desirability of economic growth is to debate
whether women should have the chance to cease to be beasts of burden, and
to join the human race.
—W. Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth, 1955
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I. Introduction
The secular decline in the relative price of durables and equipment is
one of the most significant dimensions of technological progress of the
twentieth century. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) argue
that it can account for approximately 60% of the growth in aggregate
output in the United States in the postwar period. The decline in price
and resulting diffusion of home appliances are part of this phenome-
non. While Long (1958) was possibly the first to link technological prog-
ress in this area to rising female labor force participation, Jeremy
Greenwood and several coauthors have extensively explored its impact
on fertility (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke 2005), the
growth in leisure (Greenwood and Vandenbroucke 2005), and women’s
participation (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu 2005). Given the
deep changes in the allocation of market and nonmarket time within
the household potentially linked to the diffusion of home appliances, it
is naturalto conjecture that householdformation shouldalso be affected.
Greenwood and Guner explore this conjecture and conclude that the de-
clineinpriceofhomedurablescanaccountforvirtuallyalltheriseindivorce
rates and the decline in marriage rates experienced by the United States
sinceWorldWarII.Thisoutcomearisesintheirmodelbecausehomeproduc-
tion weighs more heavily on single households and the gains from marriage
decline as home appliances become cheaper and incomes rise.
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gains from marriage in the theory and on the empirical evidence in sup-
port of this mechanism. I will then comment on the related trends in fer-
tility and on the role of gender, as well as on the potential endogeneity of
progress in home production. In my final remarks, I relate the paper to
the broader context and delineate several challenges for future work.
II. Theory
The main premise of the theoretical analysis is that a decline in the price
of home appliances reduces the gains from marriage. Two critical as-
sumptions generate this result. The first is the presence of nonconvex-
ities in consumption. Specifically, there are economies of scale in the
consumption of home and market goods, with a household equivalence
scale of 2
  with   ∈ ð0;1Þ for married households. In addition, there is a
fixed household setup cost, c, denominated in market goods, which is
the same for singles and married households. These nonconvexities im-
ply that singles are poor relative to married households. The per capita
time endowment net of the household setup costs is lower for singles,
plus singles need to finance higher levels of consumption per capita. The
second critical assumption is that marginal utility declines faster for
home than for market goods.
Taken together, these features imply that singles’ home production
output and input per capita are higher than for married households
as a fraction of their potential labor earnings. Singles also spend a larger
share of their adjusted time endowment on home appliances. This
property of the model determines the evolution of the utility gains from
marriage. Singles benefit more from a reduction in the price of home
durables since they devote a larger fraction of their time to home pro-
duction. They also benefit more from a rise in wages since this entails a
reduction in the fixed household setup cost, which weighs more heavily
on them. Progress both in the home and in the market contributes to a
decline in the utility gains from marriage. Is this mechanism plausible?
The long‐run predictions of the model critically rely on the assump-
tion that the household setup cost is constant across household types
and over time. This assumption seems rather unrealistic. Consider chil-
dren who contribute to the fixed household setup cost in terms of mar-
ket and home consumption. While they are notably absent from the
model, children are typically present in married households but not
in single households. This suggests that the fixed household cost should
depend on the type of household and may in part be endogenous.
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constant over time. Clearly, standards in the level of indispensable con-
sumption rise with income. For example, the quality of acceptable hous-
ing, an expenditure item that can be considered part of the household
setup cost, increases with income. Allowing for the fixed household setup
costtorisewithwageswouldnotonlymakethemodelmorerealisticbut
also isolate the effect of the decline in the price of home appliances on the
gains from marriage.
The assumption that the marginal utility of home goods declines
faster than that of market goods implies a negative relation between
the demand for home‐produced goods and household income. Instead,
there is substantial qualitative evidence in support of a positive relation
between home hours and household income for the early decades of the
twentieth century (Ramey, forthcoming). This positive correlation was
driven in part by the smaller living quarters for low‐income households
aswellasbylowerlevelsofhomeproductionoutput.Forexample,studies
of wage earners’ diets suggest that historically the working classes relied
on ready‐made rather than home‐produced foods. If we adopt Becker’s
broader interpretation of home production output, which includes joint
production of leisure activities that involve market goods and time
of the household members, the assumption that the demand for home‐
produced goods declines with income becomes even harder to motivate.
Finally, the model features multiple channels through which a reduction
in the price of home appliances reduces the gains from marriage. The pres-
ence of economies of scale in consumption is often justified with fixed con-
sumption costs that have a lower per capita impact in larger households.
Whythenisitnecessarytoalsoincludeafixedhouseholdcostinthemodel?
Both these features imply that singles are poor relative to married house-
holds,whichcombinedwiththeinferiorityofhomegoodsdrivesthequal-
itative properties of the model. A model with fixed household setup costs
in home goods, without any special assumptions on preferences, would
presumably deliver the same qualitative properties. The presence of these
multiplechannelstendstoamplifytheimpactoftechnologicalprogresson
household formation. If the quantitative performance of the model de-
pends on this amplification, it would be useful to clarify this property.
III. Link between Evidence and Theory: Has Home Production
Declined?
One of the key predictions of the model is that household time devoted
to home production should decline, especially for single households.
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marital status and by gender starting as early as 1900. Unfortunately,
a nationally representative data source for home hours prior to World
War II is not available. Still, with a variety of surveys that were con-
ducted in the early decades of the twentieth century, it is possible to
compile reliable estimates of home hours by marital status for women
and in the aggregate for men. Ramey (forthcoming) has carefully re-
viewed and reconciled the available sources to generate an accurate
and comprehensive set of estimates of home hours that provide consis-
tent information on this variable for the entire course of the twentieth
century. I will be drawing from these estimates in my discussion.
A. Aggregate Home Hours
The path of per capita home hours is reported in figure 1 (left axis). The
figure also displays the time series for an index of the time price of
home durables, starting in 1920 (right axis). The details on the construc-
tion of this index can be found in Albanesi and Olivetti (2007). The time
price of home durables declines linearly between 1920 and 1965, with
small additional progress after that date. Per capita home hours decline
from 26 hours per week in 1900 to 21.5 per week in 2005, but the decline
is clearly nonmonotone. Specifically, the path of aggregate home hours
seems to have evolved in three distinct phases.
Fig. 1. Home hours and the time price of home appliances. Sources: Albanesi and
Olivetti (2007); Ramey (forthcoming).
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24.5 per week. In this period, progress in home production amounted
mostly to the installation of modern plumbing facilities and electrifica-
tion. Home appliances were still expensive and unreliable. Urbanization
and declining fertility may in part rationalize the decline in home hours
in this period since the diffusion of home appliances was still very re-
stricted.Allmeasuresoffertilityexperiencedadeclineinthisperiod.Spe-
cifically,the total fertilityrate
2 declinedfrom just under 4in 1900to 2.6 in
1930 (Jones and Tertilt, forthcoming).
ii) 1930–60: Per capita home hours rise from 24.5 to 26.2. The rise in
home hours starting in the 1930s is a puzzle precisely because in the sec-
ondpartofthistimeperiodthediffusionoflaborsavinghomeappliances
is more substantial.
3 Whywas there “morework formother”?This ques-
tion serves as the subject of Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s seminal 1983 book.
Mokyr (2000) offers an interesting perspective on the so‐called Cowan
paradox. He argues that the scientific discoveries that occurred be-
tween the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury increased knowledge of the causes and transmission mechanisms
forinfectiousdiseases.Theawarenessofaconnectionbetweenhygiene,
nutrition, and health contributed to an increase in the demand for cer-
tain home‐produced goods and services, as housewives strived to in-
corporate these new principles in the conduct of such basic activities
as food preparation and house cleaning. Home hours experienced an
increase, despite the availability of laborsaving home appliances. Per-
h a p st h em o s to b v i o u sf o r c eb e h i n dt h eu p s u r g ei nh o m eh o u r si nt h i s
period is the rise in fertility. The presence of an additional child adds
1.6 hours per week if the child is over the age of 5 (Ramey, forthcoming)
andatleast15hoursperweekifundertheageof1(AlbanesiandOlivetti
2007), mostly accounted for by the time required for (breast) feeding.
Since the total fertility rate grew from 2.3 in 1940 to 3.7 in 1960 (Jones
and Tertilt, forthcoming), the increase in home hours seems rather less
surprising.
iii) After 1960:Percapita home hours declinefrom 26 to 21.5 per week.
The decline mostly takes place between 1960 and 1985, when home
hours reach 22 per week. Fertility over this period exhibits a sharply
declining trend, with the total fertility rate dropping to 1.8 in 1980.
But this is also the phase that corresponds to the introduction of mod-
ern and efficient versions of standard home appliances, including the
microwave, as well as additional complementary innovations, such
as frozen meals.
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The strong link between home hours and the presence of children in the
householdhasdominatedmydiscussion.Allavailabletimeuseevidence
clearly establishes this link, and it also emerges from the strong positive
correlation between household size and percapita home hours in the ag-
gregate, plotted in figure 2. Again, the baby boom years stand out with a
marked rise in the hours per household. However, the effect of the baby
boom is to increase the demand for home hours not just through an in-
crease in household size but also through a change in household compo-
sition. Schoellman and Tertilt (2007) report that the number of adults per
household declined from three to two between 1940 and 1960, whereas
thenumberofchildrenperhouseholdincreasedfromtwotothree.While
each additional childincreasesthetimedevotedtohomeproduction,ad-
ditional adults have the opposite effect (Ramey, forthcoming).
C. Home Hours by Marital Status and Gender
My discussion has so far concentrated on aggregate home hours,
though the key predictions of the theory concern the distribution of
Fig. 2. The correlation between home hours and household size. Source: Ramey
(forthcoming).
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home hours by marital status and gender.
Two striking observations emerge. First, home hours for all cate-
gories, except nonemployed women, actually rise between 1900 and
2000, with the most substantial rise occurring up until 1965. Starting
in 1984, home hours start rising again for all categories. The increase in
home hours is most notable for single employed women and men. Sec-
ond,thedeclineinaggregatehomehoursismostlydrivenbychangesin
behavior of women, in particular, the increase in the fraction of em-
p l o y e dw o m e n( s e ef i g .4b e l o w )a n dt h ed e c l i n ei nh o m eh o u r sf o r
nonemployed women. A back of the envelope calculation suggests that
the rise in the fraction of employed women plays by far the dominant
role since it accounts for 141% of the decline in aggregate home hours,
whereas the decline in average weekly home hours of nonemployed
Table 1






Employed All Men All
1900 54.9 27.1 7.0 46.8 3.9 24.7
2000 38.1 27.6 17.7 29.1 16.5 22.9
Source: Ramey (forthcoming).
Note: Average hours per week, ages 18–64.
Fig. 3. Estimates of home production, ages 18–64. Source: Ramey (forthcoming)
Comment 283women accounts for only 62% of the decline in aggregate home hours.
By contrast, the change in home hours of employed males accounts for
−53%ofthedeclineinaggregatehomehours.
4Whileitisnotpossibleto
d e c o m p o s em a l eh o m eh o u r sb ym a r i tal status, time use evidence for
the United States from the postwarperiod suggests that the rise in male
home hours is strongly driven by the behavior of married men,
5 and
t o t a lh o m eh o u r sf o rs i n g l em e na r el o w e rt h a nt h em a l ea v e r a g e .
Taken together, the cross‐sectional evidence suggests that the decline
in home production input in the aggregate was mostly driven by the en-
try of women into the workforce, a fact that the model fails to address. In
addition, home hours for single households, male or female, were and
remain significantly lower than for married households, though there
hasbeenaconvergenceinthepostwarperiod.Thisconvergenceisdriven
by a decline in the home hours of married women and an increase in
home hours for single women. These facts contradict the main predic-
tions of the theory.
IV. Is Progress in Home Production Exogenous?
The principal premise of the analysis is that the progress in home tech-
nologies is exogenous. While it is undisputable that the development of
the basic technologies used in home appliances was the outcome of
scientific discoveries that can be considered independent from home
production and household formation, a variety of other considerations
suggest that the application of these technologies to the production of
home appliances might have been at least in part driven by demand.
For one, as previously noted, scientific discoveries on disease transmis-
sion and nutrition may have increased the demand for home produc-
tion output, thus fueling the growth of home appliances. Even without
this development, three observations suggest that the diffusion of home
appliances may have been endogenous. First, the female/male earnings
ratio and married women’s labor force participation started rising be-
fore (functional) laborsaving home appliances became available. Sec-
ond, market substitutes for home hours and appliances were in use
before the introduction of home appliances. Third, changes in the wage
structure in the early decades of the twentieth century likely induced a
decline in the supply and a consequent rise in the cost of domestic
workers.
Evidence in Goldin (1990) supports the first observation. She reports
that the female/male earnings ratio in manufacturing rose from approx-
imately 35% in 1820 to above 50% in the early decades of the twentieth
Albanesi 284century, the biggest increase ever experienced by this variable.
6 Figure 4
documents the positive trend in women’s participation, which starts in
the earliest 1900s. Participation of women at ages 25–34 and 35–64 rose
from 3% and 5%, respectively, for the 1876–85 birth cohort to 15% and
close to 20% for the 1906–15 birth cohort.
The availability of market substitutes for home hours even before the
introduction of home appliances is corroborated first of all by the fact
that home hours of employed married women are virtually constant
over time, conditional on the number of children, as seen in figure 3.
Evidence from the 1917–19 Cost of Living Services in Moehling (2001)
suggests that households outsourced many basic chores. For example,
70% of households were using commercial laundry services, 33% were
eating meals at restaurants, and only 16% employed servants.
The number of households employing domestics declined sharply
between 1900 and 1970, though this decline was not monotone, as
shown in figure 5. A sharp decline occurred between 1900 and 1930.
Several factors likely contributed to this decline. The increase in the skill
level of the workforce, owing to the effects of the high school move-
ment, a rise in manufacturing wages, and the emergence of the clerical
sector, reduced the appeal of domestic service occupations. Increasingly
restrictive immigration legislation introduced in the 1920s also limited
Fig. 4. Labor force participation of married women by cohort and age. Source: Author’s
calculations based on Goldin (1990).
Comment 285the supply of workers to this market.
7 The temporary rise in the num-
ber of domestics during the 1930s may have been a response to the scar-
city of other more desirable jobs as the Great Depression unfolded. The
postwar period is characterized by a continued drop in the percentage
of households with domestic servants.
Taken together, these observations point to a hypothesis alternative
to the one proposed by Greenwood and Guner. The development of
home appliances is an endogenous response to the following factors:
a rise in the demand for home‐produced goods originating from scien-
tific discoveries on the importance of hygiene and nutrition for health
and a rise in the demand for substitutes for labor input into home pro-
duction, due to the rising labor force participation of married women
and a decline in the supply of domestics.
The potential endogeneity of progress in home appliances does not
diminish its role in the transformation of home and market work and
the resulting evolution in the gains from marriage. However, it does
raise questions on the interpretation of the results in the paper. The
quantitative analysis suggests that technological progress can account
for virtually all the trend in marriage and divorce between 1950 and
Fig. 5. Percentage of households with domestic servants, 1900–1970. Source: Historical
Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, series D 236–682 and series A 350–52.
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were responsible for the diffusion of home appliances do not exert
any independent effects? This conclusion would perhaps be warranted
if the model’s implications for home hours were broadly consistent with
the empirical evidence. However, the data on home hours by marital
status are stronglyat odds withone of the keypredictions of the theory.
Inlightofthisconflict,weshouldbecautiousininterpretingthesuccess
in matching aggregates as evidence in favor of its basic mechanism.
V. Challenges
The historical decline in aggregate home hours is mostly driven by
changes in behavior of women, in particular, the increase in the fraction
of employed (married) women. This has led to a remarkable transfor-
mation in women’s economic role and initiated a path toward gender
equality in economic outcomes that should affect both the nature and
the distribution of the gains from marriage. One may dispute the role of
technological progress since there is nothing intrinsically gendered
about a washing machine or rising productivity and the rise in women’s
participationprecedes thediffusion of home appliances.
8 If there is alink
between the transformation of women’s economic role and technologi-
calprogress,itmustbefoundinthe endogenousresponseofhousehold
behavior.
A growing literature explores the determinants of the rise in women’s
participation. Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) concentrate
on the diffusion of home appliances. Since they simply assume the at-
tribution of roles within the household, their analysis cannot shed light
o ni t sd e t e r m i n a n t so v e rt i m e .O t h e r technological explanations that
have been proposed endogenize gender roles on the basis of biological
differences. Galor and Weil (1996) explore the rise in demand for jobs
that require intellectual, as opposed to physical, skills. Albanesi and
Olivetti (2007) analyze the impact of medical progress in the area of
pregnancy and childbirth. Cultural factors are also important empiri-
cally (Fernandez and Fogli 2005), and their endogenous evolution has
been studied to explain the historical transformation of women’s role
(Fernandez 2007; Fogli and Veldkamp 2008). Cultural and technological
factors may of course interact. Goldin (2002) explores the endogenous
changes in the degree of job and wage discrimination by gender result-
ing from technological change.
9
Thisbodyofworkmostlyabstractsfrommodelinghouseholddecisions
explicitly, a critical step in the analysis for the gains from marriage,
10 and
Comment 287does not draw implications for household formation.
11 This points to a
clear direction for future research. Before embarking on this program,
however, it is necessary to inspect more closely the contribution of the
variousdeterminantsofgenderroles.Twostrategiesfordoingthisimme-
diately come to mind. All the existing hypotheses are based on the same
broad stylized facts, but they have different cross‐sectional implications.
This variation could be exploited to inspect the mechanism inherent in
eachtheory.Accuratemeasurementbasedondetailedhistoricalevidence
is key to make progress in this dimension. Additionally, each theory has
so far been considered in isolation. Each factor may in fact be relevant
only inspecific timeperiodsor fordifferent types ofagents. Forexample,
Albanesi and Olivetti (2007) show that improvements in reproductive
medicinecanfullyaccountfortheriseinparticipationofmarriedwomen
in childbearing age between 1920 and 1950, and progress in home tech-
nologies is essential to match the labor market behavior of older married
women after 1950.
Whyisitimportanttoattempttoisolatetheeffectofthevariousforces?
For one, it would enable us to reach a deeper understanding of their im-
pact, which is valuable in itself. It is also critical for policy analysis. The
potential distortions and the benefits associated with different govern-
ment programs are sensitive to the mechanism through which key out-
comes, such as female participation, marriage patterns, or fertility, are
determined. Finally, it would enable a potentially fruitful spillover from
macroeconomics to development economics. The nature of the link be-
tween gender equality and development is disputed (Duflo 2005). A
structural analysis of the historical experience in the United States and
otheradvancedcountriescouldprovideimportantinsightsintohowtech-
nological diffusion can affect gender equality and influence development.
Endnotes
1. Citation reproduced from Goldin (1994, 3).
2. The total fertility rate is defined as the sum of the age‐specific birth rates over all
women alive in a given year. See Jones and Tertilt (forthcoming) for a discussion of dif-
ferent fertility measures.
3. Though production of home appliances was interrupted during World War II.
4. The data for female and male participation for this calculation are from Goldin
(1990).
5. The wife/husband ratio of home hours drops from 1.89 in 1965 to 1.59 in 2003. See
Knowles (2007).
6. See tables 3.1 and 3.2 in Goldin (1990). Data are for full‐time workers where available.
7. The Immigration Act of 1917 was the first intervention. The Emergency Quota Act of
1921, soon followed by the more restrictive Immigration Act of 1924, or Johnson‐Reed
Act, established a national origins quota system that was effectively in place until 1952.
Albanesi 2888. Doepke and Tertilt (2008) argue that the process of “women’s liberation” begins be-
fore their entry into the labor force.
9. Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) examine the effect of a declining gender wage
gaponmarriedwomen’sparticipationinthepostwarperiod.Sincetheytreatthisgapasexog-
enous, their analysis cannot explain the endogenous evolution of gender roles. Albanesi and
Olivetti (2009) build a model in which gender wage gaps arise endogenously, but they focus
on the cross‐sectional variation in gender earnings inequality.
10. Knowles (2007) shows that the change in the distribution of work within married
households in the postwar period can be rationalized only with a nonunitary model of
household behavior.
11. There is a dearth of quantitative research linking the transformation in gender roles
with household formation. The existing work concentrates on household size via fertility.
See Galor and Weil (1996), Doepke, Hazan, and Maoz (2007), and Albanesi and Olivetti
(2008).
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